Iraq, Bush and Tom by Oldtimer.

[oldtimer]

OK; You all know I retired from the military, so normally I'm very supportive of military operations and don't provide too much commentary about the current administration when our troops are fighting. But, I wanted to research the claims that are made about the following:

1) Iraq and WMD

2) Did Bush intentionally miss-lead America so we could invade Iraq.

3) I threw Tom in on the title because I knew he wanted to comment. So, instead of my address Tom's claims, he will provide that.

What the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace document "WMD in IRAQ; evidence and implications"

1. Did a WMD threat to U.S. and/or to global security exist in Iraq, and if so, precisely what was it?

“They reveal that the threat as the war began lay not in stockpiles or active production of
unconventional weapons, but in Iraq’s long-standing determination to acquire such weapons, its scientific and technical resources (including facilities and human resources) to make them, and its demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons. These Constituted a long-term danger that could not be ignored or allowed to fester unaddressed.”

2. Was there reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would turn over unconventional weapons or WMD capability to Al Qaeda or other terrorists?

Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna has pointed out that the Iraqi regime had a long history of sponsoring terrorism against Israel, Kuwait, and Iran, providing money and weapons to these groups. Yet over many years Saddam did not transfer chemical, biological, or radiological materials or weapons to any of them “probably because he knew that they could one day be used against his secular regime.”

(Oldtimer’s commentary: It appears all elements of the government (Administration, Intelligence, & DOD) miss-understood this aspect.

3. Were there errors in intelligence regarding the existence and extent of Iraqi WMD? If so, when did they arise and were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?


From the currently available material, it appears that two distinct periods will emerge—before 2002, and from then until the outbreak of the war.

In the earlier period, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programs but to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Access to and within Iraq was, of course, limited. Other possible sources of error suggest a failure to track the degradation of what was known to have been in Iraq after the 1991 war, including quantities of weapons and agent and their lethality. These errors may have been due to an incorrect extrapolation that production and capabilities would continue to grow regardless of inspections and sanctions, and/or to the assumption that anything for which there was not absolute proof of destruction remained and remained active. It is also possible that views of Saddam Hussein’s character were allowed to drive technical assessments.

In the second period, the shift….between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense. This is indicated by the Vice President’s repeated visits to CIA headquarters123 and demands by officials for access to the raw intelligence from which analysts were working. Also notable is the unusual speed with which the NIE was written and the high number of dissents in what is designed to be a consensus document. Finally, there is the fact that political appointees in the Department of Defense set up their own intelligence operation reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the caveated judgments being reached by intelligence professionals. Although some of those who were involved have claimed that analysts did not feel pressured, it strains credulity to believe that together these five aspects of the process did not create an environment in which individuals and agencies felt pressured to reach more threatening judgments of Saddam Hussein’s weapon programs than many analysts felt were warranted.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: Prior to 2002, the Intelligence community believed that Iraq had WMD and would use them. After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community and failed to recognize the change in the situation and information of the Intelligence community. I believe the pressures of 9/11 caused the administration to overreact.)

4. Did administration officials misrepresent what was known and not known based on intelligence? If so, what were the sources and reasons for these misrepresentations? Are there precautions that could be taken against similar circumstances in the future?

The report states: Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs and ballistic missile programs, beyond the intelligence failures noted above.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: It appears that the Administration words, phrases, and poorly written intelligent reports. However, I think that with everything that had happened post 9/11 and the intelligent information errors, the Administration represented what they believed in the most defendable light. I don’t agree it was based on complete deception.)

5. How effective was the more-than-ten-year-long UN inspection, monitoring, and sanctions effort in Iraq? What lessons can be drawn regarding the applicability of international pressure to prevent proliferation elsewhere?

In their first six years, UNSCOM, which was responsible for inspecting, dismantling, and monitoring Iraq’s chemical, biological, and missile materials and capabilities, and the IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq’s nuclear program, achieved substantial successes. To the best of present knowledge, they were ultimately able to discover and eliminate most of Iraq’s unconventional weapons and production facilities and to destroy or monitor the destruction of most of its chemical and biological weapon agent.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: It does appear that the inspection worked. However, this is hindsight. At the time, the decision was made for the invasion, this knowledge was unclear.)

6. Was Iraq deterrable, or had deterrence been superseded by a terrorist threat only fully appreciated after 9/11?


The transforming effect of 9/11 was revealingly spotlighted by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (also casting doubt on the entire WMD debate) when he remarked: “The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11th.”

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: I think this quote says it all, based on the 9/11 and the poor Intelligence or lack of confidence in the Intelligence Community, decisions were made. It doesn’t mean it was made for Oil, or Kellogg Brown and Root, or personal revenge, it was made out of the desire to protect the country. Is just easier to evaluate the Administration’s actions after the fact with information they didn’t have at that time.)

Tom - Your up.....Just kidding, I didn't do this to pick on you. I actually learned a lot about the Iraq situation. Major mistake were made, Iraq had some ties to Al Qada, but, not WMD. What the adminstration said about the capacity to build WMD wasn't spin, that is what Iraq was doing. A tactical decision to produce chemical component during the fight, instead of stockpiling.

[obiefan]

=D>

[Tom Araya]

Oldtimer, you would have to post something meaningful right when I'm getting ready to go out of town for a week (I leave in less than 4 hours). I will try to address this from the road.

[oldtimer]

Oldtimer, you would have to post something meaningful right when I'm getting ready to go out of town for a week (I leave in less than 4 hours). I will try to address this from the road.

Now you know how I feel when I stuck in STL airport with no wireless.

Did I say St. Louis sucks.

P.s. Last minute trip, I thought you were going to the royals on Tuesday.

[Tom Araya]

Oldtimer, you would have to post something meaningful right when I'm getting ready to go out of town for a week (I leave in less than 4 hours). I will try to address this from the road.

Now you know how I feel when I stuck in STL airport with no wireless.

Did I say St. Louis sucks.

P.s. Last minute trip, I thought you were going to the royals on Tuesday.

Was going to but had to go out of town. Be back Sunday. No time for any in-depth discussions this week. :(

[oldtimer]

[quote="Tom Araya":5ca62]Oldtimer, you would have to post something meaningful right when I'm getting ready to go out of town for a week (I leave in less than 4 hours). I will try to address this from the road.

Now you know how I feel when I stuck in STL airport with no wireless.

Did I say St. Louis sucks.

P.s. Last minute trip, I thought you were going to the royals on Tuesday.

Was going to but had to go out of town. Be back Sunday. No time for any in-depth discussions this week. :([/quote:5ca62]

No problem.....did you get Jonathan's email about Fantasy Football? Have you registered.

[Tom Araya]

Got it but haven't registered yet. Plan to do so when I get home Sunday morning.

[Tom Araya]

OK; You all know I retired from the military, so normally I'm very supportive of military operations and don't provide too much commentary about the current administration when our troops are fighting. But, I wanted to research the claims that are made about the following:

1) Iraq and WMD

2) Did Bush intentionally miss-lead America so we could invade Iraq.

3) I threw Tom in on the title because I knew he wanted to comment. So, instead of my address Tom's claims, he will provide that.

What the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace document "WMD in IRAQ; evidence and implications"

1. Did a WMD threat to U.S. and/or to global security exist in Iraq, and if so, precisely what was it?

“They reveal that the threat as the war began lay not in stockpiles or active production of
unconventional weapons, but in Iraq’s long-standing determination to acquire such weapons, its scientific and technical resources (including facilities and human resources) to make them, and its demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons. These Constituted a long-term danger that could not be ignored or allowed to fester unaddressed.”

2. Was there reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would turn over unconventional weapons or WMD capability to Al Qaeda or other terrorists?

Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna has pointed out that the Iraqi regime had a long history of sponsoring terrorism against Israel, Kuwait, and Iran, providing money and weapons to these groups. Yet over many years Saddam did not transfer chemical, biological, or radiological materials or weapons to any of them “probably because he knew that they could one day be used against his secular regime.”

(Oldtimer’s commentary: It appears all elements of the government (Administration, Intelligence, & DOD) miss-understood this aspect.

3. Were there errors in intelligence regarding the existence and extent of Iraqi WMD? If so, when did they arise and were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?


From the currently available material, it appears that two distinct periods will emerge—before 2002, and from then until the outbreak of the war.

In the earlier period, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programs but to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Access to and within Iraq was, of course, limited. Other possible sources of error suggest a failure to track the degradation of what was known to have been in Iraq after the 1991 war, including quantities of weapons and agent and their lethality. These errors may have been due to an incorrect extrapolation that production and capabilities would continue to grow regardless of inspections and sanctions, and/or to the assumption that anything for which there was not absolute proof of destruction remained and remained active. It is also possible that views of Saddam Hussein’s character were allowed to drive technical assessments.

In the second period, the shift….between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense. This is indicated by the Vice President’s repeated visits to CIA headquarters123 and demands by officials for access to the raw intelligence from which analysts were working. Also notable is the unusual speed with which the NIE was written and the high number of dissents in what is designed to be a consensus document. Finally, there is the fact that political appointees in the Department of Defense set up their own intelligence operation reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the caveated judgments being reached by intelligence professionals. Although some of those who were involved have claimed that analysts did not feel pressured, it strains credulity to believe that together these five aspects of the process did not create an environment in which individuals and agencies felt pressured to reach more threatening judgments of Saddam Hussein’s weapon programs than many analysts felt were warranted.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: Prior to 2002, the Intelligence community believed that Iraq had WMD and would use them. After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community and failed to recognize the change in the situation and information of the Intelligence community. I believe the pressures of 9/11 caused the administration to overreact.)

4. Did administration officials misrepresent what was known and not known based on intelligence? If so, what were the sources and reasons for these misrepresentations? Are there precautions that could be taken against similar circumstances in the future?

The report states: Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs and ballistic missile programs, beyond the intelligence failures noted above.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: It appears that the Administration words, phrases, and poorly written intelligent reports. However, I think that with everything that had happened post 9/11 and the intelligent information errors, the Administration represented what they believed in the most defendable light. I don’t agree it was based on complete deception.)

5. How effective was the more-than-ten-year-long UN inspection, monitoring, and sanctions effort in Iraq? What lessons can be drawn regarding the applicability of international pressure to prevent proliferation elsewhere?

In their first six years, UNSCOM, which was responsible for inspecting, dismantling, and monitoring Iraq’s chemical, biological, and missile materials and capabilities, and the IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq’s nuclear program, achieved substantial successes. To the best of present knowledge, they were ultimately able to discover and eliminate most of Iraq’s unconventional weapons and production facilities and to destroy or monitor the destruction of most of its chemical and biological weapon agent.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: It does appear that the inspection worked. However, this is hindsight. At the time, the decision was made for the invasion, this knowledge was unclear.)

6. Was Iraq deterrable, or had deterrence been superseded by a terrorist threat only fully appreciated after 9/11?


The transforming effect of 9/11 was revealingly spotlighted by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (also casting doubt on the entire WMD debate) when he remarked: “The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11th.”

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: I think this quote says it all, based on the 9/11 and the poor Intelligence or lack of confidence in the Intelligence Community, decisions were made. It doesn’t mean it was made for Oil, or Kellogg Brown and Root, or personal revenge, it was made out of the desire to protect the country. Is just easier to evaluate the Administration’s actions after the fact with information they didn’t have at that time.)

Tom - Your up.....Just kidding, I didn't do this to pick on you. I actually learned a lot about the Iraq situation. Major mistake were made, Iraq had some ties to Al Qada, but, not WMD. What the adminstration said about the capacity to build WMD wasn't spin, that is what Iraq was doing. A tactical decision to produce chemical component during the fight, instead of stockpiling.

Alright, I read this carefully. To what would you like me to respond? For now, I'll just try to respond as I think you'd like, which is to either refute or accept your points. Here goes:

Point 1: Having any discussion at this point about WMDs in regard to Iraq seems irrelevant.

In a March 2003 address to the nation, Bush said: "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

Lt. General James Conway, USMC declares: "It was a surprise to me then, it remains a surprise to me now, that we have not uncovered weapons... in some of the forward dispersal sites. Again, believe me, it’s not for lack of trying. We’ve been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they’re simply not there... We were simply wrong." (May 30, 2003)

British Prime Minister Tony Blair finally concedes: "I have to accept we haven't found them and we may never find them. We don't know what has happened to them. They could have been removed. They could have been hidden. They could have been destroyed." (July 6, 2004)

And straight from the horse's mouth: "Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there." Bush (Oct. 7, 2004)

A history of the WMD lies on my favorite website: http://www.rotten.com/library/history/war/wmd/saddam/

Can we finally stop talking about WMD? They are a figment of your imagination.

[Tom Araya]

2. Was there reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would turn over unconventional weapons or WMD capability to Al Qaeda or other terrorists?

Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna has pointed out that the Iraqi regime had a long history of sponsoring terrorism against Israel, Kuwait, and Iran, providing money and weapons to these groups. Yet over many years Saddam did not transfer chemical, biological, or radiological materials or weapons to any of them “probably because he knew that they could one day be used against his secular regime.”

(Oldtimer’s commentary: It appears all elements of the government (Administration, Intelligence, & DOD) miss-understood this aspect.


On this we agree. Except maybe for the "misunderstood" part. I think they just handily ignored it because it didn't fit into what they wanted to do.

[Tom Araya]

3. Were there errors in intelligence regarding the existence and extent of Iraqi WMD? If so, when did they arise and were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?


From the currently available material, it appears that two distinct periods will emerge—before 2002, and from then until the outbreak of the war.

In the earlier period, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programs but to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Access to and within Iraq was, of course, limited. Other possible sources of error suggest a failure to track the degradation of what was known to have been in Iraq after the 1991 war, including quantities of weapons and agent and their lethality. These errors may have been due to an incorrect extrapolation that production and capabilities would continue to grow regardless of inspections and sanctions, and/or to the assumption that anything for which there was not absolute proof of destruction remained and remained active. It is also possible that views of Saddam Hussein’s character were allowed to drive technical assessments.

In the second period, the shift….between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense. This is indicated by the Vice President’s repeated visits to CIA headquarters123 and demands by officials for access to the raw intelligence from which analysts were working. Also notable is the unusual speed with which the NIE was written and the high number of dissents in what is designed to be a consensus document. Finally, there is the fact that political appointees in the Department of Defense set up their own intelligence operation reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the caveated judgments being reached by intelligence professionals. Although some of those who were involved have claimed that analysts did not feel pressured, it strains credulity to believe that together these five aspects of the process did not create an environment in which individuals and agencies felt pressured to reach more threatening judgments of Saddam Hussein’s weapon programs than many analysts felt were warranted.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: Prior to 2002, the Intelligence community believed that Iraq had WMD and would use them. After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community and failed to recognize the change in the situation and information of the Intelligence community. I believe the pressures of 9/11 caused the administration to overreact.)


I don't think 9/11 had anything to do with it. They had plans to invade Iraq as early as 1997. A cursory glance at the website for the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University would tell you that.

November 12, 1997 David Wurmser, director of the Middle East program at the American Enterprise Institute, writes an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that the US government should support Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress [INC] and work to foment “an Iraqi insurgency to depose the butcher of Baghdad.” Wurmser writes: “Washington has no choice now but to abandon the coup option and resurrect the INC. An insurgency may be able to defeat Saddam’s weak and demoralized conventional army. But one thing is clear: There is no cost-free way to depose Saddam. He is more resolute, wily and brutal than we. [Wall Street Journal, 11/12/1997]

January 26, 1998 The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an influential neoconservative think tank, publishes a letter to President Clinton urging war against Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein because he is a “hazard” to “a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil.” In a foretaste of what eventually happens, the letter calls for the US to go to war alone, attacks the United Nations, and says the US should not be “crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.” The letter is signed by many who will later lead the 2003 Iraq war. 10 of the 18 signatories later join the Bush Administration, including (future) Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretaries of State John Bolton and Paula Dobriansky, presidential adviser for the Middle East Elliott Abrams, and Bush’s special Iraq envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. [Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 3/16/2003; Project for the New American

And worse, Israel had such plans as early as 1996:

July 8, 1996 The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, publishes a paper titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” [Chicago Sun-Times, 3/6/2003; Washington Times, 10/7/2002] The paper, whose lead author is Richard Perle, advises the new, right-wing Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to break with the policies of the previous government by adopting a strategy “based on an entirely new intellectual foundation, one that restores strategic initiative and provides the nation the room to engage every possible energy on rebuilding Zionism ....” Much along the lines of an earlier paper by Israeli Oded Yinon (see February 1982), the document urges the Israelis to aggressively seek the downfall of their Arab neighbors—especially Syria and Iraq—by exploiting the inherent tensions within and among the Arab States. Specifically, it recommends that Israel work with Turkey and Jordan to remove Saddam Hussein from power as a means of “foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.” [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/19/2003; Studies, 7/8/1996] Other suggestions for Israel include abandoning the Oslo Accords, developing a foreign policy based on a traditional balance of power strategy, reserving its right to invade the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of a strategy of “self-defense,” abandoning any notion of “land for peace,” reestablishing a policy of preemptive strikes, forging closer ties to the US while taking steps towards self-reliance, and seeking an alternative to Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO. [Studies, 7/8/1996]

The smoking guns are all around you.

[Tom Araya]

Alright, I have to get ready for my daughter's birthday now. I'll respond to the rest later tonight. I look forward to our dialogue!

[Tom Araya]

3. Were there errors in intelligence regarding the existence and extent of Iraqi WMD? If so, when did they arise and were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: Prior to 2002, the Intelligence community believed that Iraq had WMD and would use them. After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community and failed to recognize the change in the situation and information of the Intelligence community. I believe the pressures of 9/11 caused the administration to overreact.)


Were there errors? Are lies considered erroneous statements? Are rhetorical questions legitimate? Does Don Rumsfeld always have to talk like this?

Bush stood there in his State of the Union Address giving information that he KNEW was false. He was warned by multiple agencies that the yellow-cake story was not true. The U.N. inspectors told the administration again & again that there were no weapons present. Now we hear the repetitive drumbeat again in regards to Iran. Perpetual war for perpetual peace. You guys have surely read Orwell. . .

What steps could be taken to avoid a repetition? How about an impeachment of the entire administration & their removal? That might help.

Finally, your commentary that, "After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community" is, and I really hate to say this, laughable. I only hate to say this because friends shouldn't say such things to one another, but I don't know how to put it more politely. The administration has pretty much ignored the intelligence community every step of the way & instead fixed facts to support their vision.

[Tom Araya]

4. Did administration officials misrepresent what was known and not known based on intelligence? If so, what were the sources and reasons for these misrepresentations? Are there precautions that could be taken against similar circumstances in the future?

The report states: Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programs and ballistic missile programs, beyond the intelligence failures noted above.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: It appears that the Administration words, phrases, and poorly written intelligent reports. However, I think that with everything that had happened post 9/11 and the intelligent information errors, the Administration represented what they believed in the most defendable light. I don’t agree it was based on complete deception.)


I respectfully disagree with you. I strongly feel, based on all that the neocon think tanks were writing in the mid & late 90s, that they were going into Iraq come 9/11 or not. Remember, these neocons stated that we needed a "Pearl Harbor-like moment" to get into Iraq. They got it, which makes for juicy conspiracy theories. Whether or not some in the administration are complicit in 9/11 I do not know (and shudder to even think about the possibilities were it true), but please take the time to read their own words. We were collectively duped because the media was either too lazy, too ignorant, or too connected (via their editorial boards and ownership) to point out these things.

[Tom Araya]

6. Was Iraq deterrable, or had deterrence been superseded by a terrorist threat only fully appreciated after 9/11?


The transforming effect of 9/11 was revealingly spotlighted by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (also casting doubt on the entire WMD debate) when he remarked: “The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11th.”

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: I think this quote says it all, based on the 9/11 and the poor Intelligence or lack of confidence in the Intelligence Community, decisions were made. It doesn’t mean it was made for Oil, or Kellogg Brown and Root, or personal revenge, it was made out of the desire to protect the country. Is just easier to evaluate the Administration’s actions after the fact with information they didn’t have at that time.)


I do hope you'll respond to the facts as they are; that is, what about all of the writings you can read for yourself on James Baker's website and all of the Project for a New American Century stuff where they spelled out reasons for toppling Saddam as early as 1996? 9/11 provided them no new prism; it simply provided them their Pearl Harbor moment.

[Tom Araya]

OK; You all know I retired from the military, so normally I'm very supportive of military operations and don't provide too much commentary about the current administration when our troops are fighting

Barbara Ehrenreich said it best: "No matter that patriotism is too often the refuge of scoundrels. Dissent, rebellion, and all-around hell-raising remain the true duty of patriots."

I believe you provided us the definition of blind patriotism.

[oldtimer]

3. Were there errors in intelligence regarding the existence and extent of Iraqi WMD? If so, when did they arise and were they based on faulty collection or analysis, undue politicization, or other factors? What steps could be taken to prevent a repetition?


From the currently available material, it appears that two distinct periods will emerge—before 2002, and from then until the outbreak of the war.

In the earlier period, the intelligence community appears to have had a generally accurate picture of the nuclear and missile programs but to have overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Access to and within Iraq was, of course, limited. Other possible sources of error suggest a failure to track the degradation of what was known to have been in Iraq after the 1991 war, including quantities of weapons and agent and their lethality. These errors may have been due to an incorrect extrapolation that production and capabilities would continue to grow regardless of inspections and sanctions, and/or to the assumption that anything for which there was not absolute proof of destruction remained and remained active. It is also possible that views of Saddam Hussein’s character were allowed to drive technical assessments.

In the second period, the shift….between prior intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE suggests, but does not prove, that the intelligence community began to be unduly influenced by policymakers’ views sometime in 2002. Although such situations are not unusual, in this case, the pressure appears to have been unusually intense. This is indicated by the Vice President’s repeated visits to CIA headquarters123 and demands by officials for access to the raw intelligence from which analysts were working. Also notable is the unusual speed with which the NIE was written and the high number of dissents in what is designed to be a consensus document. Finally, there is the fact that political appointees in the Department of Defense set up their own intelligence operation reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the caveated judgments being reached by intelligence professionals. Although some of those who were involved have claimed that analysts did not feel pressured, it strains credulity to believe that together these five aspects of the process did not create an environment in which individuals and agencies felt pressured to reach more threatening judgments of Saddam Hussein’s weapon programs than many analysts felt were warranted.

(Oldtimer’s Commentary: Prior to 2002, the Intelligence community believed that Iraq had WMD and would use them. After 2002, the administration lost confidence in the Intelligence community and failed to recognize the change in the situation and information of the Intelligence community. I believe the pressures of 9/11 caused the administration to overreact.)


I don't think 9/11 had anything to do with it. They had plans to invade Iraq as early as 1997. A cursory glance at the website for the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University would tell you that.

November 12, 1997 David Wurmser, director of the Middle East program at the American Enterprise Institute, writes an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that the US government should support Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress [INC] and work to foment “an Iraqi insurgency to depose the butcher of Baghdad.” Wurmser writes: “Washington has no choice now but to abandon the coup option and resurrect the INC. An insurgency may be able to defeat Saddam’s weak and demoralized conventional army. But one thing is clear: There is no cost-free way to depose Saddam. He is more resolute, wily and brutal than we. [Wall Street Journal, 11/12/1997]

January 26, 1998 The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an influential neoconservative think tank, publishes a letter to President Clinton urging war against Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein because he is a “hazard” to “a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil.” In a foretaste of what eventually happens, the letter calls for the US to go to war alone, attacks the United Nations, and says the US should not be “crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.” The letter is signed by many who will later lead the 2003 Iraq war. 10 of the 18 signatories later join the Bush Administration, including (future) Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretaries of State John Bolton and Paula Dobriansky, presidential adviser for the Middle East Elliott Abrams, and Bush’s special Iraq envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. [Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 3/16/2003; Project for the New American

And worse, Israel had such plans as early as 1996:

July 8, 1996 The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, publishes a paper titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” [Chicago Sun-Times, 3/6/2003; Washington Times, 10/7/2002] The paper, whose lead author is Richard Perle, advises the new, right-wing Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu to break with the policies of the previous government by adopting a strategy “based on an entirely new intellectual foundation, one that restores strategic initiative and provides the nation the room to engage every possible energy on rebuilding Zionism ....” Much along the lines of an earlier paper by Israeli Oded Yinon (see February 1982), the document urges the Israelis to aggressively seek the downfall of their Arab neighbors—especially Syria and Iraq—by exploiting the inherent tensions within and among the Arab States. Specifically, it recommends that Israel work with Turkey and Jordan to remove Saddam Hussein from power as a means of “foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.” [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/19/2003; Studies, 7/8/1996] Other suggestions for Israel include abandoning the Oslo Accords, developing a foreign policy based on a traditional balance of power strategy, reserving its right to invade the West Bank and Gaza Strip as part of a strategy of “self-defense,” abandoning any notion of “land for peace,” reestablishing a policy of preemptive strikes, forging closer ties to the US while taking steps towards self-reliance, and seeking an alternative to Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO. [Studies, 7/8/1996]

The smoking guns are all around you.

The pentagon has plans to invade practically every country in the world. There is no scenario that does not have are invasion planned down to which national guard and reserve unit will go to which part of the world. It's been this way since the late 50s.

[Tom Araya]

Having plans "just in case" is one thing.

Having plans with the intention of utlizing them once in power is quite another.

[oldtimer]

Having plans "just in case" is one thing.

Having plans with the intention of utlizing them once in power is quite another.

You say Tomato - I say Tomato

It sounds better in stereo.

I was thinking about this last night. It is standard procedure for the pentagon to update plans as each new administration comes in and as the world changes. Remember that at one time the Iraq Army was the 5th largest in the world and by our own understanding the CIA and other Intelligence organization didn't fully understand that threat Iraq posed in the decade following the 1st Gulf War.

Now,,,,,no one can know what Bush had on his agenda prior to talking office as it relates to Iraq. However, I as sure as anyone can be that he did not have knowledge of any particular "War Plan", especially the specific Iraq "Scenario".

He may have had a plan (an idea in his own mind) prior to holding office. But, he didn't have any pre-developed or the pentagon didn't develop prior to him taking office any "War Plans" for Iraq.

They is just beyond my way of rational thinking. I could go with you on the theory that Bush wanted to invade, kick butt, or another term a Texan would use prior to and after his election. But, the idea that he knew the National most secret strategic "War Plans" prior to being the President. I can’t see it!

Anyone that made through basic training in the Army or Marines, I don't know about the other services, are indoctrinated into a way of thinking. I guess it could be call "Blind Patriotism", but, it has to be that way. There is no kind of Patriotism that would drive a person to rush up a hill with bullets flying by or to commit ones life to doing their job in the military knowing that you could die. It's a form of Brain Washing, but, it was to be. Wars are not won by individuals; they are won by a group of persons, teams, units Armies, and services (Army Navy, Air force & Marines). After a lifetime (21 years) of such thinking, I could see how it could be call "Blind Patriotism" and maybe it is!

But, if a country must go to war (I not saying if we SHOULD or SHOULDN’T) the people that conduct those military operations must be “Blind” to the politics of the situation. The ONLY way an Official Order can be disobeyed is if it is Unlawful. Right or Wrong the Constitution and Congress gave the President the Legal Authority to invade Iraq. So, the military (From private walking in Bagdad to the 4 Star Generals and their staff developing “War Plans” have to complete the tasks assigned to them.

[Tom Araya]

My ears only function in mono.

[oldtimer]

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-17-iran-missiles_x.htm

You have to call this one a good accomplishment for Bush:

Used legal Intel, Used Legal International Deplomancy, & stopped shipment of missle to a Non Terrorist Goup>

[legrider]

I am glad we had them wire taps and them eyes in the sky or these probably would have killed many people!

[Tom Araya]

I'm all for eavesdropping on non-Americans w/o a warrant. I could give a $hit about non-Americans.

But, if you're gonna snoop on Americans, at least do it legally. Please don't use my Constitution as your toilet paper.

[oldtimer]

I'm all for eavesdropping on non-Americans w/o a warrant. I could give a $hit about non-Americans.

But, if you're gonna snoop on Americans, at least do it legally. Please don't use my Constitution as your toilet paper.

Come on Tom...........I want to read your words, that state, he did good in this one...........

I DARE You

[Tom Araya]

My job here is only to point out Shrub's foibles & follies. It's really an easy job, truth be told.

But good job for the intelligence analysts who discovered this shipment & blocked it.

[RP-in-Nebraska]

My job here is only to point out Shrub's foibles & follies. It's really an easy job, truth be told.


Hmmm. I would think that you would want to at least TRY to be fair.....as much as it is in your blood. :-)

[oldtimer]

My job here is only to point out Shrub's foibles & follies. It's really an easy job, truth be told.

But good job for the intelligence analysts who discovered this shipment & blocked it.

Right or Wrong - Good or Bad,

The Commander is responsible for everything, when an Analyst does something right, the Commander gets the credit.

Same as the corporate world, the fellows on the line at the Ford Plant made a quality product, the CEO get a bonus to leading the company.

:-D

[Tom Araya]

[quote="Tom Araya":f0662]My job here is only to point out Shrub's foibles & follies. It's really an easy job, truth be told.


Hmmm. I would think that you would want to at least TRY to be fair.....as much as it is in your blood. :-)[/quote:f0662]

I am fair. I have pointed out when Bush & Co. have done the right thing. When Condi at least gave the appearance of talking/negotiating, I said kudos to them. However, Shrub's foibles & follies seem to outnumber any good he's doing by a ratio of about 100/1 (unscientific measure, of course).

[oldtimer]

[quote="RP-in-Nebraska":b60b0][quote="Tom Araya":b60b0]My job here is only to point out Shrub's foibles & follies. It's really an easy job, truth be told.


Hmmm. I would think that you would want to at least TRY to be fair.....as much as it is in your blood. :-)[/quote:b60b0]

I am fair. I have pointed out when Bush & Co. have done the right thing. When Condi at least gave the appearance of talking/negotiating, I said kudos to them. However, Shrub's foibles & follies seem to outnumber any good he's doing by a ratio of about 100/1 (unscientific measure, of course).[/quote:b60b0]


:lol: Tom,,,,,your talking about the past.....I haven't seen you say the George and co. did Good on this one in particular.

I Double Dog Dare You!

[Tom Araya]

Maybe if you had picked up my bar tab last night, I would feel more generous today!

[oldtimer]

Maybe if you had picked up my bar tab last night, I would feel more generous today!

You can blame RP for that......I can't remember what he did; but, it was because of him that I call the Bartender and cancelled the tab.

[RP-in-Nebraska]

Maybe if you had picked up my bar tab last night, I would feel more generous today!

You can blame RP for that......I can't remember what he did; but, it was because of him that I call the Bartender and cancelled the tab.

:^o
[-X
=;

[oldtimer]

[quote="Tom Araya":39c10]Maybe if you had picked up my bar tab last night, I would feel more generous today!

You can blame RP for that......I can't remember what he did; but, it was because of him that I call the Bartender and cancelled the tab.

:^o
[-X
=;[/quote:39c10]

Like I said, I can't remember. But, your taking the fall.

:D

[RP-in-Nebraska]

Getting back to the topic of Iraq, who can tell me the president that started our current policy in the middle east?

Let me give you a hint: Under his administration he issued the Carter Doctrine. Yes, Reagan expanded it, Bush 1 invoked it, Clinton used it, and Bush 2 is engaged in it right now, but Carter initiated and defined our Mid-East policies 26 years ago.

Yes, after doing a bit of research into the matter, it seems little Jimmy is the president responsible for urging Iraq to go to war with Iran in 1980 for a few reasons - first and foremost was so that U.S. oil supply was not diminished or cut off.

Read the following quote from Carter's 1980 State of the Union address and tell me why all of the liberals and Bush bashers have adopted the slogan "No Blood for Oil" when it was clearly not Bush's primary reason for going to war with Iraq but it WAS Carter's primary reason for covertly encouraging Saddam to start a war with Iran. Also, read the final paragraph below and tell me why Bush is blamed for our foreign dependence upon oil when we knew more than 20 years before Bush took office that our dependence upon foreign oil was a "clear and present danger to our Nation's security"?

Seriously, why?

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world. We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It's imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a 5-percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction.


The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

[Tom Araya]

when it (oil) was clearly not Bush's primary reason for going to war with Iraq

:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

You're effing kidding me, right?

[Tom Araya]

The difference, RP, is that Carter was dealing with an Iranian hostage crisis & a recent invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets, our arch-enemy. How exactly was Iraq a threat to our national security? Because of al-Qaeda? Because of Osama? No, because Iraq was preparing to start trading in Euros instead of dollars. . .hence, the reluctance on many European nations not to back our "war for oil."

[RP-in-Nebraska]

Almost everyone believed that Iraq had WMD's. Heck, even Colin Powell, a moderate and who you said on a different thread that you'd vote for him for president, sold our case for WMD's to the U.N. It was a very convincing speech with lots of visual aids. Perhaps you remember. We now know that Iraq didn't have WMD's (or if they did, they quickly found a way to get rid of them), but our intelligence and that of the international community certainly indicated that Iraq DID have WMD's.

Remember UN Resolutions 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986, 1284, and especially 1441? If Iraq didn't have WMD's, why wouldn't Saddam just let the inspectors do their job and provide proof that they no longer had them? For whatever reason, he didn't. Don't you believe that such open and constant refusals and defience to inspectors can be interpreted as guilt. It certainly makes sense to me.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ ... penElement (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement)

[Tom Araya]

Almost everyone believed that Iraq had WMD's. Heck, even Colin Powell, a moderate and who you said on a different thread that you'd vote for him for president, sold our case for WMD's to the U.N. It was a very convincing speech with lots of visual aids. Perhaps you remember. We now know that Iraq didn't have WMD's (or if they did, they quickly found a way to get rid of them), but our intelligence and that of the international community certainly indicated that Iraq DID have WMD's.


Perhaps you missed the Downing Street memo. Bush Inc. knew all along that they were full of you know what:

http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/

[PS: Powell was duped & now calls the U.N. speech the blackest moment of his career. Further, I could post all 1,000 pages of Charles Duelfer's report, but that would seem overkill. Instead, I offer the Washington Post's "Cliff's": http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ar ... 4Oct5.html (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9790-2004Oct5.html)]

[Tom Araya]

Remember UN Resolutions 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986, 1284, and especially 1441? If Iraq didn't have WMD's, why wouldn't Saddam just let the inspectors do their job and provide proof that they no longer had them? For whatever reason, he didn't. Don't you believe that such open and constant refusals and defience to inspectors can be interpreted as guilt. It certainly makes sense to me.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ ... penElement (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement)

You should know by now that Shrub is a tad bit deceptive. Here's the administration's position:

"And so the choice was Saddam Hussein's choice. He could have not fooled the inspectors. He could have welcomed the world in. He could have told us what was going on. But he didn't. And so we moved."
—President George W. Bush, July 7, 2006

And the facts:

"U.N. weapons inspectors entered Iraq on November 27th, 2002."
-UN Weapons Inspector Dimitri Perricos

Inspectors searched for illegal weapons, finding few and only minor violations, "no evidence that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program," and "no mobile facilities for producing weapons."
-UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix

Their work still incomplete but progressing, weapons inspectors fled Iraq in March 2003 when the U.S. advised them to leave, because an American attack was imminent.
-Source: USA Today, carrying an Associated Press article, citing Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency

After the invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration would not allow U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq.
-Source: Sydney Morning Herald, quoting White House spokesman Ari Fleischer

It seems to me that, by & large, Americans are conspicuously ignorant of their government & its actions. One should never accept what a politician says at face value & instead should dig deeper.

The bigger questions are these: Why not let the inspectors continue their search? Why defy the world & act unilaterally & cause the great unrest we are now witnessing? What was the big hurry? The administration knew there were no WMDs, and to date, none have been found (save some degraded materials that were no longer usable). RP, you do yourself a great disservice for simply accepting administration rhetoric on blind faith.

[RP-in-Nebraska]

Much has been discovered since the Duelfer Report.

The Downing Street Memo is by no means a smoking gun. For one, the document is a retyped version of a copy of an original - something the journalist admitted to after the numerous questions of authenticity were raised. He said he copied the original, returned the original, and typed his version of the memo on a typewriter and made multiple copies of it and attempted to make it seem authentic. Shady journalism at best even if he copied the document 100% accurately with no typing errors or reworded sentences. Furthermore, who would doubt that Bush and Blair were discussing Iraq in July of 2002? They told us that in their speeches in the summer of 2002!

I will put together some very good information for you this week and provide it in a post in the near future.